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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT: PART II
V.

STATE EXPUNGEMENT

STATUTES

FEDERAL CRIMINAL STATUTES:

AND

THEIR EFFECT ON

UNITED STATES V. POTTS

In United States v. Potts,' the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the effect of a state expungement provision' on a federal criminal

statute which requires a prior felony conviction as an element of the
offense.3 In so doing, the court overruled its previous decision in
United States v. Hoctor,4 a precedent of less than three years. At the
same time, the court reiterated its position that a state expungement

statute is relevant to a determination of whether or not one has been
convicted of a felony for purposes of applying a federal criminal law.
The approach taken by the court in these two cases is in conflict with
other circuits 5 which have considered the issue. Moreover, when the
opinions are analyzed in light of this conflict and the dissenting opinion
of Judge Carter in Hoctor6 and the concurring opinion of Judge Sneed
in Potts1 it can be seen that the court significantly failed to properly
analyze federal law and to provide adequate support for its opinion.
In Hoctor the defendant was charged with receiving explosives in
interstate commerce. He was prosecuted under a federal statute making
1. 528 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1975).
2. The Washington expungement statute provides that upon fulfillment of the condi-

tions of probation, a defendant may withdraw his plea of guilty, and enter a plea of not
guilty, or if convicted on a plea of not guilty, the court may set aside the verdict of
guilty; and in either case,
the court may thereupon dismiss the information or indictment against such defendant, who shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting
from the offense or crime of which he has been convicted. The probationer shall
be informed of this right in his probation papers: Provided, That in any subsequent
prosecution, for any other offense, such prior conviction may be pleaded and

proved, and shall have the same effect as if probation had not been granted, or the
information or indictment dismissed.
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.95.240 (1961).
3. Potts was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a)(1) (1970).
20 infra.
4. 487 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1973).
5. See notes 44-57 infra and accompanying text.

6. 487 F.2d at 272.
7. 528 F.2d at 887.

See note
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it unlawful for anyone convicted "of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" to transport or receive explosives in
foreign or interstate commerce. 8 In sustaining the district court's dismissal of the charge against Hoctor, the circuit court relied on the
express wording of the Washington expungement statute,9 state supreme
court decisions interpreting the statute, 0 and an opinion by the Washington Attorney General." As the court then believed, the expunge-

ment statute "absolutely erased" Hoctor's conviction from his record,
restoring to him the "same rights" and "the same status" as any citi-

zen. 2

The court agreed with Hoctor's claim that the expungement

statute "removed him from the class of persons subject to § 842(i),"'
the federal statute in question. 4

8

In rejecting the government's contention that the expungement provi-

sion could not affect Hoctor's criminal liability under federal law, the
court read section 842() in light of section 848. This latter section
provides:
No provision of this chapter [including section 842(i)] shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the
field in which such provision operates to the exclusion of the law of any
State on the same subject matter, unless there is a direct and positive
conflict between such provision and the law of the State so that the
two cannot be reconciled or consistently stand together.' 5
The court determined that section 848 was applicable. First, Washington law and section 842(i) deal with the same subject matter-the
rights and disabilities of convicted felons.' 6 Second, reading section
8. Hoctor was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 842(i) (1970), which provides in part:
(i) It shall be unlawful for any person(1) who is under indictment for, or who has been convicted in any court of, a
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;
to ship or transport any explosive in interstate or foreign commerce or to receive
any explosive which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
9. 487 F.2d at 271. See note 2 supra.
10. 487 F.2d at 271. The court relied on Matsen v. Kaiser, 443 P.2d 843 (Wash.
1968) and Tembruell v. Seattle, 392 P.2d 453 (Wash. 1964).
11. 487 F.2d at 271.
12. Id.

13. Id.
14. See note 8 supra.

15. 18 U.S.C. § 848 (1970).
16. 487 F.2d at 272. On a somewhat questionable basis, the court found that the two
statutes dealt with the same subject:
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848 as stating that state law was presumed to apply if no contrary
federal provisions were set forth, the court found the state law concerning the status of a conviction was relevant to determine if Hoctor had

suffered a conviction. 17 This latter conclusion was based on the fact
that no standards are provided in the federal statutes for determining

"when an individual has been convicted of a crime for the purposes of
[section 842(i)]."'

Finally, the court concluded that since the ex-

pungement provision predated section 842(i), Congress, had it intended
to do so, could have made clear its intent to override the state statute.' 9
In Potts, the defendant was charged with a violation of a federal

statute, section 1202, which prohibits a convicted felon from receiving,
possessing, or transporting a firearm in interstate commerce.2" Although dealing with the effect of the same Washington expungement
statute, the court admitted that Hoctor was "wrongly decided,"'" and
[t]he only difference between them is that the federal law focuses specifically on
the control of explosive materials while the state statute deals in the most general
terms with the rights and disabilities of persons having criminal records.
Id.
However, the court failed to take cognizance of WASH. RIv. CODE AN. § 9.41.040
(1961), which specifically prohibits a person convicted of a violent crime from possessing
a pistol. This section, rather than the expungement statute, more accurately covers the
same subject matter as 18 U.S.C. § 842(i).
17. 487 F.2d at 272. The court stated earlier that "[w]e agree with the District
Court that the expungement procedure, as interpreted in Washington, effectively insulated Hoctor from prosecution." Id. at 271 (emphasis added).
18. Id. at 272.
19. Id. The court stated, "In light of § 848, we will not imply that it so intended."
20. 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202 (1970) provides in part:
(a) Any person who(1) has been convicted by a court of the United States or of a State or any political subdivision thereof of a felony...
and who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting commerce, ...
any firearm shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than
two years, or both.
This statute differs from the one under which Hoctor was prosecuted, section 842(i) (see
note 8 supra), since the latter requires as an element a conviction of "a crime punishable
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." However, section 1202(c) (2) uses the
same phrase to define a "felony" for the purposes of section 1202. Further, the federal
statute applies notwithstanding the fact that the defendant is sentenced to a shorter period,
provided the state statute under which sentence is imposed provides a possible punishment of at least one year. United States v. Glasgow, 478 F.2d 850, 852 (8th Cir. 1973).
In McMullen v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 1348 (C.D. Cal. 1972), the court stated:
The action taken under state law by the state Judge in disposing of the case does
not change the nature and character of the offense insofar as its classification under
the federal statutes and regulations are concerned.
Id. at 1351.
21. 528 F.2d at 884.
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that "the statute [did] not operate absolutely to erase a conviction for
all purposes.

22

However, despite this reversal of Hoctor, the court did

not indicate that the Hoctor panel was in error in allowing state law to
determine the applicability of a federal criminal statute. The basis of

the court's opinion was grounded solely upon the effect of the expungement statute under Washington law.
The court believed that the Hoctor panel had been "misled by an

opinion of the Washington State Attorney General.

'23

It therefore

interpreted the Washington statute based on a re-evaluation of the

authorities relied upon in Hoctor. 4 Based on these cases and another
case "not. called to [the court's] attention at the time Hoctor was
submitted,"2 5 the court noted the interpretation of a proviso to the

expungement statute which provided that even an expunged conviction
could be pleaded and proved in a subsequent prosecution. 20

Thus,

Potts earlier conviction could still be used to bring him within section
1202.
These decisions make it clear that the Ninth Circuit considers state

law relevant not only to a determination that a person has in the first
instance suffered a conviction, but also to a determination that a conviction is still a conviction.
22. Id. at 885.
23. Id. at 884 n.2. The court noted that the opinion of the Washington Attorney
General
relied heavily on People v. Taylor, 178 Cal. App. 2d 472, 3 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1960).
In Taylor, the court held that a conviction expunged pursuant to a California statute similar to § 9.95.240 could not be used to prove a violation of a state statute
prohibiting the possession of firearms by a convicted felon. However, the California state legislature, apparently disagreeing with the Taylor interpretation of the
California expunction statute, "immediately nullified" the holding of Taylor by a
1961 amendment to the statute.
Id. at 884-85 n.2.
24. See note 10 supra.
25. 528 F.2d at 885. The "new" case relied on by the Potts court was State v. Knott,
493 P.2d 1027 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972).
26. The proviso in WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.95.240 (1961) states:
Provided, That in any subsequent prosecution, for any other offense, such prior conviction may be pleaded and proved, and shall have the same effect as if probation
had not been granted, or the information or indictment dismissed.
The court found that this provision specifically restricted the effect of the expungement.
While the Washington state court decisions construing this provision noted that it is the
only exception to the broad restoration of rights accorded by the expungement statute,
they also indicated it was consonant with. the "benevolent policy" behind the statute. 528
F.2d at 885. The Potts court found that since State v. Knott, 493 P.2d 1027 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1972), allowed an expunged conviction to be used to impeach a witness, it could
clearly be pleaded and proved as part of a subsequent criminal prosecution. 528 F.2d at
885.
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The dissenting opinion of Judge Carter in Hoctor and the concurring
opinion of Judge Sneed in Potts took issue with the court's approach. As
framed by Judge Carter in Hoctor, the issue before the court was
"whether a state legislature may define the terms of a federal statute,"
and "whether a prior conviction ceases to be a prior conviction when a
state law 'expunges' it.'2 7 This same issue was before the court in
Potts. Both Carter and Sneed expressed a belief that the court was in
error in finding the state expungement law relevant to the interpretation
and application of a federal criminal statute.
Judge Carter correctly criticized the majority opinion in Hoctor for its
preemption analysis. He noted that the majority misapplied section
848, the legislative preemption section.2 8 According to Carter, section
842(i) and the Washington state expungement statute, contrary to ,the
court's conclusion, did not concern the same subject matter. He referred to a House Report which stated:
[T]his section [section 848] sets forth the intent of Congress that this
chapter shall not be construed to operate to the exclusion of State
statutes concerning explosive materials ....29
He concluded that, because the Washington state expungement statute
did not deal with explosive materials, section 848 was not relevant.
Judge Carter then continued with what he considered to be a proper
application of section 848. He directed his attention to section
845(b)30 which allows the Secretary of the Treasury to relieve a person
of the disabilities of section 842(i). 3 Carter noted that section 845(b)
gives the Secretary power to do exactly what the state expungement
purports to do-determine that a particular person may be trusted with
explosives despite a prior conviction. Since Congress intended this
27. 487 F.2d at 272.
28. Id. at 274. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
29. H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1970), quoted in 487 F.2d at 274.
30. 18 U.S.C. § 845(b) (1970) provides:
[a] person who had been indicted for or convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year may make application to the Secretary
for relief from the disabilities imposed by this chapter with respect to engaging in
the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing inexplosive materials, or the
purchase of explosive materials, and incurred by reason of such indictment or conviction, and the Secretary may grant such relief if it is established to his satisfaction
that the circumstances regarding the indictment or conviction, and the applicant's
record and reputation, are such that the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the relief will not be contrary to the public interest. A licensee or permittee who makes application for relief from the disabilities incurred under this chapter by reason of indictment or conviction, shall not be barred by such indictment or conviction from further operaitons under his license or permit pending final action on an application for relief
filed pursuant to this section.
31. See note 8 supra.
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determination to be made to the satisfaction of the Secretary, whose discretion is guided by federal policy, the scheme intended by Congress
is disrupted if a state, guided by state policies, may make the determination to nullify a conviction for purposes of § 842(i). If the state's
determination should differ from the Secretary's we would face a direct
conflict between state and federal authority.

Congress surely intended

no such conflict. § 845(b) suggests the congressional desire that,
for purposes of § 842(i), only federal authority can "expunge" a con32
viction.

Thus, he found "a direct conflict between the state statute and §
845(b): by giving effect to the state statute in this case we would
deprive the Secretary of the final authority vested in him by Congress.""

It appears that Judge Carter was correct in his preemption analysis
and his conclusion would dispose of the issue before the court. More

importantly, his analysis pinpoints the questionable interpretation of
federal law upon which the majority opinion was based, i.e., that section

848 evidenced a congressional intent that state law should apply unless
displaced by a specific federal enactment.

Indeed, in a case subsequent

to Hoctor, the Ninth Circuit stated with regard to its holding in Hoctor
that it had reconciled Washington law with federal law "in light of
congressional intent not to override prior State law extant in the field,
expressly provided in section 848 . . . s It is highly questionable
whether such an interpolation of intent can be given to section 8 4 8 .11
32. 487 F.2d at 294.
33. Id.
34. United States v. Andrino, 497 F.2d 1103, 1107 n.4 (9th Cir. 1974). See also
Hyland v. Fukuda, 402 F. Supp. 84, 91 (D. Hawaii 1975). In Andrino, which arose
after Hoctor but prior to Potts, the court examined the effect of the expungement statutes
of both California (CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West 1970)) and Nevada (NEv. Rv.
STAT. § 176.225 (1975)) on prior state convictions in regard to the defendant's convictions of violating sections of both Title IV and Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(6), 924(a) (1970); 18 U.S.C. App. §
1202(a) (1) (1970). In upholding the defendant's convictions, and finding that the
California expungement statute did not afford relief to Andrino, the court expressly
distinguished the Hoctor holding on the grounds that Washington and California
are at direct variance in treating this particular problem under their laws. Since
the determination of Andrino's status under California law is quite clear in that he
should be deemed not exempt from liability under the expungement statute, the remaining question posed and resolved in Hoctor as to a Federal and Washington
State conflict is avoided.
497 F.2d at 1107 n.4. Having thus found that Andrino's status under California law did
not exempt him from liability, the court stated it was unnecessary to consider the
possible effect of the Nevada expungement statute. Id. at 1107.
35. The Potts majority, in a footnote (528 F.2d at 886 n.5) characterized the
approach of the Eighth Circuit, (see notes 47-52 infra and accompanying text) which is
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This assumption that state law was intended to apply was also implicit in
Potts where it was even less supportable since Title VIE," which con-

tains section 1202, 37 contains no legislative preemption section comparable to section 848.
the same as Sneed's approach, as a preemption analysis. Judge Sneed disputed this
characterization stating that
.[preemption relates to situations in which both the federal and state governments
have authority to legislate and the federal legislation indicates that it is intended
to replace state legislation pro tanto. Here the issue is simply the extent to which
a federal criminal statute requires reference to state law in its interpretation and
application. Judge Koelsch's characterization suggests an "ouster" of state law
under the Eighth Circuit's interpretation when in fact such law is merely deemed
irrelevant to the proper interpretation of a federal criminal statute.
Id. at 888.
Thus to the extent the issue is one of relevancy, and not preemption, it is questionable
that a preemption statute can be used as evidence of congressional intent that state law
will apply to define the scope of a federal criminal statute. The purpose behind a
preemption provision like section 848 is simply to indicate that a state law dealing with
the same subject matter as a federal law can still be given effect without violating the
supremacy clause.
In this respect it is significant to note that the language of section 848 states that
"[nio provision of this chapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of
Congress to occupy the field in which such provision operates. . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 848
(1970) (emphasis added). It is difficult to see how such a statement of negative intent
on preemption can be construed as a statement of positive intent that all state law should
apply absent contrary provisions in federal law.
Also worthy of note is the decision of the Seventh Circuit, in Thrall v. Wolfe, 503
F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975) (see notes 53-61 infra and
accompanying text), which found that the purpose of Congress in enacting a provision
analogous to section 848 was "to avoid a claim of preemption." Therefore the court
could find no congressional intent to make a state expungement statute relevant to a
determination of whether one has been convicted for the purpose of applying federal law.
36. Not only is there no legislative preemption section, there is evidence that
Congress might have intended section 1203 to be an exclusive statement of the exceptions from liability under section 1202. Senator Long of Louisiana, the sponsor of Title
VII, including the present sections 1202 and 1203, stated in introducing the bill that:
[w]hen a man has been convicted of a felony, unless-as this bill sets forthhe has been expressly pardoned by the President and the pardon states that the person is to be permitted to possess firearms in the future, that man would have no
right to possess firearms. He would be punished criminally if he is found in possession of them.
114 CoNo. Rac. 13,868 (1968) (emphasis added). Also, immediately before the
approval of this bill by the Senate, Senator Long stated that these provisions seek
to make it unlawful for a firearm-be it a handgun, a machinegun, a long-range
rifle, or any kind of firearm-to be in the possession of a convicted felon who has
not been pardoned and who has therefore lost his right to possess firearms. It
would not apply to a person pardoned by a Governor or a President if the pardon
specifically provides that he will have the right to carry firearms. He would then
have that right. Otherwise, he would not have it.
Id. at 14,773 (emphasis added). For the persuasiveness of these comments as evidence
of legislative intent see Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1971).
37. Section 1202, which Potts was convicted of, was enacted as part of Act of June 19,
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 1202, 82 Stat. 236.
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In relation to this assumption of congressional intent, Judge Carter
identifies the proper analysis to be followed in determining the relevancy
of state law: the court should look for an expression of intent by
Congress that state law is to apply.38 In Hoctor, prior to addressing the
court's pre-emption analysis, he engaged in an independent analysis of
section 842(i),19 an analysis that would apparently be applicable to any

federal statute that does not involve a question of pre-emption. After a
preliminary examination of the terms used by Congress, Carter stated

that "[t]he expungement should be allowed to affect the terms of
[section 842(i)] only if the state's policy coincides with the federal purpospose." 40 Concluding that the policies did not coincide, Justice
Carter stated that
we must generally assume, in the absence of a plain indication to the
contrary, that Congress when it enacts a statute is not making the application of the federal act dependent on state law. That assumption is
based on the fact that the application of federal legislation is nationwide and at times on the fact that the federal program would be im41
paired if state law were to control.

He concluded his analysis of section 842(i) by stating that while it is
clear Congress intended that state law be relevant to determine if one
has been convicted, "[t]here is . . . no indication, plain or otherwise,
that Congress intended to allow state law to say a conviction is not a

conviction for the purposes of § 842(i). '' 2

38. 487 F.2d at 270.
39. Id. at 273.
40. Id.
41. Id., quoting Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1942) (citations
omitted).
42. Id. at 274.
Judge Ely has recognized that it is a question of congressional intent whether state
expungement law should relieve a party of one of the penalties imposed by federal law.
However, he finds that if there is congressional intent that state laws apply to determine
a conviction, then there must be a congressional intent that state law be examined to
determine the effect of post-conviction procedures on the conviction. In Kelly v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 349 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1965), a case involving the
proper application of California's old expungement statute (CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4
(West 1970)) to the Immigration and Naturalization Act's deportation statute which has
since been repealed (8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1970)), Ely dissented and explained the
rationale for his position when he stated:
[O]ur court has said that while it will respect California law, insofar as California
law provided for the crime and the "conviction," it may not accord to California
the same respect in the application of its statute or of its decisions in the interpretation of the effect of a subsequent procedure taken under a California statute of
the same dignity as that which created the crime. Not only does the logic of this
approach escape me, but it is also true, I believe, that such a pronouncement is opposed to a principle which was hitherto thought to have been quite well established,
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Similarly, Judge Sneed, in Potts, argued that expungement statutes
"do not rewrite history; they merely provide that previous history is
immaterial for certain purposes under state law."'4 3 In his view, only
Congress can make a determination that a prior event (the conviction of
a person in a state court) is irrelevant to the application of a federal
criminal statute. To this end he stated it was necessary to examine the
federal statutes
to determine the extent to which state expunction statutes are to be
considered as relevant either to the finding of a "co.nviction" by a court
of an "exemption" within the scope of 18
of a state or the presence
44
U.S.C. App. § 1203.
Under section 1203(2), 45 a person is exempted from section 1202 only
if he has received a presidential or gubernatorial pardon. Thus, Judge
Sneed concluded:
A search of these provisions yields no express or implied reference to
such statutes. I conclude from this that Congress chose to consider
state expunction statutes irrelevant [both for determining if 4 6one has
suffered a conviction or if they are entitled to an exemption].
Other circuit courts, interpreting both section 1203 and sections
analogous to section 845(b), have applied the same reasoning as Justices Carter and Sneed. In United States v. Kelly,4 7 the Eighth Circuit
reversed a lower court which had dismissed a charge of violation of
section 1202 on the basis of a Minnesota expungement statute. 48 Like
349 F.2d 473, 475. (For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's approach in this area, see
note 62 infra).
Ely seems particularly concerned by the anomolous situation that exists when state law
determines a conviction but not the subsequent effect of such a conviction. This concern
overlooks the possibility that Congress may have in fact intended this anomaly. Insofar
as the state law is used to determine whether there is a conviction, Congress is allowing
at least 50 different interpretations of the federal statute. To the extent that it does not
deem state law relevant beyond this initial determination, it may be minimizing this
variance.
43. 528 F.2d at 887.
44. Id.
45. 18 U.S.C. App. § 1203(2) (1970) provides:
This title shall not apply to(2) any person who has been pardoned by the President of the United States
or the chief executive of a State and has expressly been authorized by the President
or such chief executive, as the case may be, to receive, possess, or transport in commerce a firearm.
46. 528 F.2d at 887.
47. 519 F.2d 794 (8th Cir. 1975).
48. MnN. STAT. ANN. § 242.31 (West 1972) provides that:
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Judge Sneed, the court believed that section 1203(2) provided the only
method for relieving one from the disabilities of section 1202.49 The
court relied on its earlier interpretation of those sections in United States
v. Mostad,5 0 where it stated:
The Act exempts from its provisions "...
any person who has
been pardoned by the President of the United States or the chief executive of a State and has expressly been authorized by the President of
[sic] such chief executive, as the case may be, to receive, possess or
transport in commerce a firearm. . . ." The defendant is not such a
person. He belongs to a general class of convicted felons whose civil
rights have been restored by a statute that is silent with respect to the
right of such persons to possess firearms.5 1

The Kelly court believed that Congress, by recognizing that only certain
pardons would relieve one of criminal liability under section 1202, did

not "wish to recognize other means which the states might employ to
expunge felony convictions .... -52 Thus no congressional intent to
[wihenever a person committed to the authority upon conviction of a crime is discharged from its control other than by expiration of the maximum term of commitment ... or by termination of its control ... such discharge shall, when so ordered by the authority, restore such person to all civil rights and shall have the effect of setting aside the conviction and nullifying the same and of purging such person thereof ....
Whenever a person has been placed on probation by the court ... and, after
satisfactory fulfillment thereof, is discharged therefrom, the court, on application
of the defendant or on its own motion and after notice to the county attorney, in
its discretion may likewise so order.
The effect of such orders is to restore to the convicted person all civil rights and relieve
him of all disabilities arising from the conviction; however the conviction may still be
used in a subsequent criminal prosecution for another offense. Id. In effect it is the
counterpart of the Washington expungement statute. See note 2 supra.
49. 519 F.2d at 796.
50. 485 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 947 (1974).
51. Id. at 200. (emphasis added). Mostad concerned the relationship of another
Minnesota statute, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.165 (West 1964), to section 1203(2) in
terms of applying section 1202. This Minnesota statute provides, in part:
Subd. 1. When a person has been deprived of his civil rights by reason
of conviction of a crime and is thereafter discharged, such discharge shall restore
him to all his civil lights and to full citizenship, with full right to vote and hold
office, the same as if such conviction had not taken place, and the order of discharge shall so provide.
Subd. 2. The discharge may be:
(1) By order of the court following stay of sentence or stay of execution of sentence; or
(2) By order of the Minnesota corrections authority prior to expiration of sentence; or
(3) Upon expiration of sentence.
52. 519 F.2d at 796. See United States v. Sutton, 521 F.2d 1385, 1389-90 (7th Cir.
1975); Thrall v. Wolfe, 503 F.2d 313, 317-18 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 972
(1975). See notes 57 & 61 infra and accompanying text.
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make state expungement laws relevant to determination of liability could
be found.

In Thrall v. Wolfe,53 the Seventh Circuit interpreted section 925(c)54
which is analogous to section 845(b) and provides that a convicted

felon can apply to the Seretary of the Treasury for relief from the
disabilities imposed under Title IV." The court found that a gubernatorial pardon which specifically provided that the defendant would be

entitled "to receive, possess, or transport in commerce a firearm" 56 did
not relieve one of liability under the title."

The court believed that the

relief under section 925 was intended to be exclusive.58
The court also took note of section 927, 59 which contains language
similar to section 848, and stated, similar to Judge Carter's assertion

with regard to section 848, that
[t]he section was doubtless inserted for the purpose of avoiding a claim
of pre-emption. [The title under which the defendant was indicted]
deals with federal control of firearms, not the scope and efficacy of
pardons and it is difficult to view the Montana's pardon as "on the same
subject matter". .
Further, absent an express contrary intention,
the scope of a fedetal statute normally is not dependent on state law. 0°
As final support for its reasoning the court stated that if Congress had
intended a gubernatorial pardon to work to the same effect it could so
53. 503 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 972 (1975).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (1970) provides in part:
(c)... A person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year (other than a crime involving the use of a firearm
or other weapon or a violation of this chapter or of the National Firearms Act)
may make application to the Secretary for relief from the disabilities imposed by
Federal laws with respect to the acquisition, receipt, transfer, shipment, or possession of firearms and incurred by reason of such conviction, and the Secretary may
grant such relief if it is established to his satisfaction that the circumstances regarding the conviction, and the applicant's record and reputation, are such that the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that
the granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public interest.
55. This includes 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1970), the section Thrall was found to have
violated. Thrall v. Wolfe, 503 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 972
(1975). This section makes it unlawful for one convicted of "a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year... to ship or transport any firearm or
ammunition in interstate commerce ...."
56. Such a provision would be required under a separate title of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Title VII. 18 U.S.C. App. 1203(2) (1970).
57. 503 F.2d at 316. See note 52 supra and accompanying text. See also note 61
infra and accompanying text.
58. 503 F.2d at 317.
59. 18 U.S.C. § 927 (1970) is identical to 18 U.S.C. § 848 (1970). See text
accompanying note 15 supra.
60. 503 F.2d at 317 (citations omitted).
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state, as it had done in section 1202.1

As indicated by Judges Sneed and Carter, as well as the other circuits
that have considered the issue, the proper approach for determining

whether state expungement law should apply to the operation of federal
statutes is whether Congress has expressly indicated an intent that it
should apply. The Ninth Circuit has recognized this as the proper
approach when dealing with the effect of state expungement statutes on
federal deportation laws.62
To the extent the Hoctor court may have implicitly based its holding

upon an assumption that Congress intended state law to apply unless
displaced by federal.law, it recognized the importance of congressional

intent as dispositive of the issue of whether a state conviction remained a
conviction for purposes of applying federal law. However it seemed to
have erred in finding that Congress, in enacting section 848, intended
state law to be relevant. That section merely states Congress' desire that
state provisions covering the same conduct as federal statutes should still
be given effect. In Potts, there was even less authority for finding such

a congressional intent since there was no applicable preemption provision.

On the other hand, Judges Sneed and Carter, and the other

61. Id. at 317. See notes 53 & 58 supra and accompanying text.
62. In cases involving deportation of aliens for a conviction under state law, the Ninth
Circuit has recognized that the proper approach to determine the effect to be given a
state expungement statute is to find an express congressional intent that it should erase
the conviction for federal purposes. Applying this approach, the Ninth Circuit has found
state law relevant only to the extent of determining that one has suffered a conviction,
since it can find no evidence that Congress intended expungement statutes to apply. Thus
in De la Cruz-Martinez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 404 F.2d 1198 (9th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 955 (1969), a claim was made by the petitioner that,
because his conviction for unlawful possession of marijuana and heroin had been
expunged under California law, he was not subject to deportation pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1251(a)(11) (1970) (allowing an alien to be deported upon conviction of a narcotics
offense). In rejecting this contention, the court stated:
It would defeat the purpose. . . (of federal law) if provisions of local law, dealing
with rehabilitation of convicted persons, could remove them from the ambit of (federal penal enactments) .

. .

.

We do not think Congress intended such a result.

404 F.2d at 809, quoting Matter of A- F-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 429, 445-46. See also
Tsimbidy-Rochu v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 414 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1969);
Brownrigg v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 356 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1966); Kelly v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 349 F.2d 473 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
932 (1965). This same approach has been followed in the Fifth Circuit. Gonzalez de
Lara v. United States, 439 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1971).
For a discussion of Judge Ely's dissent in Kelly v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
349 F.2d 473 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 932 (1965), and criticism of most
of these cases, see note 42 supra.
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circuits, while properly recognizing the issue as one of congressional
intent, generally, if not always, have found state law irrelevant for
determining the application of federal statutes. It therefore appears that
they require Congress to specifically list a state expungement statute in

the section providing exemptions from federal liability. The approaches
in this respect appear to represent the two extremes in finding the existence of congressional intent.
CONCLUSION

It is clear that the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of congressional
intent, as to whether state expungement statutes should apply to the
operation of federal statutes, in both the Hoctor and Potts cases is out of
line with the other circuits and also inconsistent with the reasoning used
in its own immigration cases. Although Potts purportedly overruled
Hoctor, it did so only to the extent of reinterpreting the state law itself,
without questioning the underlying assumption that state law was relevant in the first place. It can be argued that there is a certain logic in
allowing state law to determine both whether there has been a conviction
and whether and for what purposes that conviction still exists, but as a
matter of statutory interpretation it would appear that the other circuits
are correct. Congress appears not to have intended that state expungement statutes be used to nullify state convictions for purposes of federal
criminal statutes requiring a prior felony conviction as an element of the
crime. Indeed, Congress has recently demonstrated that it will specifically include state expungement statutes as a means of extinguishing a
conviction when it intends to do so. The new Federal Rules of Evidence,
effective July 1, 1975, provide in part:
(c) Evidence of a conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the
conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate or
rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of rehabilitation of the person convicted .... 63
Therefore, unless Congress expressly indicates such an intent the courts
should not read it in to the statute.
Margaret H. Grignon

-63. FED. RULEs op Evw., Rule 602 (1976).

